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PRECAP; Elaine Mitchell v. Glacier County: Standing in the Face of
Government Accountability
Abbey Eckstein
Oral argument is set for Wednesday, August 9, 2017, at 9:30
a.m. in the Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P.
Mazurek Justice Building, Helena, Montana.
I. QUESTION PRESENTED
Under Montana Law, does Mitchell have standing against
Glacier County and the State of Montana when she alleged a foreseeable
injury? Is a foreseeable injury enough to constitute a concrete injury
required in order to have standing?
II. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Elaine Mitchell, a taxpayer in Glacier County, brought
suit against Glacier County for its mismanagement of finances.1 Mitchell
moved for partial summary judgment and class certification, and the
District Court dismissed all of Mitchell’s claims for lack of standing.2
On appeal, Mitchell argues that she has standing because she has
a foreseeable injury in the form of an increase in her property tax.3 She
seeks declaratory and injunctive relief for violations of Montana law as
well as private attorney general status.4 Mitchell also argues that she has
standing due to Article VIII Section 12 of the Montana Constitution,
which requires that governmental entities have strict accountability of
monies and revenue.5
Glacier County contends that Mitchell does not have a concrete
injury, as she only claimed that it was “foreseeable.”6 Additionally,
Glacier County argues that her claims are now moot because she did not
file for a stay or supersedeas bond.7 The State of Montana argues that
Mitchell does not have standing under the Single Audit Act (SAA)
because the Legislature did not intend for it to confer individual rights
upon plaintiffs, and the SAA is discretionary, not mandatory, for the
Department of Administration to enforce.8 The State also argues that
Appellants’ Opening Brief at 2, Mitchell v. Glacier County, https://perma.cc/F9E6-BLV7 (Mont.
Feb. 9, 2017) (No. DA 16-0716).
2
Id.
3
Id. at 11.
4
Id. at 2.
5
Id. at 12.
6
Appellee Glacier County’s Response Brief at 10, Mitchell v. Glacier County,
https://perma.cc/BZ73-NPCP (Mont. Apr. 10, 2017) (No. DA 16-0716).
7
Id. at 12.
8
Appellee State of Montana’s Answering Brief at 9–10, Mitchell v. Glacier County,
https://perma.cc/23T3-GDKB (Mont. Apr. 10, 2017) (No. DA 16-0716).
1
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Article VIII Section 12 of the Montana Constitution is not a selfexecuting clause, thus Mitchell lacks standing.9
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Elaine Mitchell, an accountant and tax preparer who
practices in Glacier County, paid her property taxes under protest due to
the County violating budgeting and accounting standards.10 This
violation was discovered through a fiscal year (FY) audit of the years
2013 and 2014.11 The audit, published in March 2015, covered the two
past years and noted several weaknesses, imbalances, and deficiencies in
Glacier County’s budget.12 The deficit fund balance due totaled $752,901
for 2013 and $1,526,925 for 2014. The report also listed the specific
violations of Montana statutes.13 The report showed that 29 separate
County funds contained over $5 million in deficits.14 Other taxpayers in
Glacier County, in addition to Mitchel, paid the entirety of their taxes
under protest.15 Mitchell brought her claims as a Glacier County property
taxpayer and on behalf of the putative class of property taxpayers in
Glacier County who paid their taxes under protest.16 The total combined
taxpayers’ protested taxes was over $1 million dollars, which Glacier
County placed in a separate protest fund. 17
Mitchell and the other plaintiffs brought six claims against
Glacier County and the State: (1) a declaration stating that they can pay
taxes under protest until the County complies with its statutory duties;
(2) a declaration that the County is violating the “strict accountability”
provision of the Montana Constitution; (3) an order requiring the State to
withhold public funds under the SAA until the County complies; (4) an
order that the State hold accountable County officials who have not
performed their duties properly; (5) an order for a receiver to be
appointed, who would ensure compliance by the County; and (6) a
declaration that the County violated the Right to Know provisions of the
State Constitution.18 In response, Glacier County and the State alleged
that the Plaintiff and putative class had no standing to bring their
action.19 The District Court ruled that the Plaintiffs lacked standing
because they had not suffered a concrete injury to property and did not
9

Id. at 32–33.
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 3.
11
Id. at 3.
12
Id. at 4-6.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 7.
15
Id. at 1; Appellee Glacier County’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 7.
16
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 2.
17
Appellee Glacier County’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 7–9.
18
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 2.
19
Appellee Glacier County’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 10; Appellee State of Montana’s
Answering Brief, supra note 8, at 10–11.
10
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have concrete rights under the Montana Constitution and statutes to
confer standing.20 The Plaintiffs appealed. 21
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A. Appellants Mitchell and Putative Class
1.
Glacier County and the State violated their fiduciary duty to the
Plaintiffs by not following the “strict accountability” clause in the
Montana Constitution.
Mitchell argues that the “strict accountability” clause in Article
VIII of the Montana Constitution puts the government in the position of a
trustee to taxpayers.22 As a trustee, the government owes a fiduciary duty
to properly manage public monies.23 Article VIII Section 12 of the
Montana Constitution states, “The legislature shall by law insure strict
accountability of all revenue received and money spent by the state and
counties, cities, towns, and all other local governmental entities.”24
Mitchell argues that the Legislature enacted statutes, such as the
Montana Local Government Accounting and Budgeting Laws and the
Local Government Budget Act, to implement the “strict accountability”
clause in the Montana Constitution.25
Additionally, Mitchell argues that Glacier County and the State
violated the SAA, which states that local units of government have to
annually file audit reports with the Department of Administration.26
Mitchell specifically points to the purpose of the SAA, listed in § 2–7–
502(2)(e), which states that the SAA is supposed to “ensure that the
stewardship of local government entities is conducted in a manner to
preserve and protect the public trust.”27 Mitchell argues that Glacier
County and the State, in particular, violated their duty to preserve and
protect the public trust by mismanaging the county funds.28
2.
Mitchell has met the three elements required to have a
justiciable controversy.

20

Id. at 5.
Id. at 3.
22
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 12.
23
Id.
24
Mont. CONST. art. VIII, § 12.
25
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 13; see MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 7–6–609 to 7–6–611
(2017) for the statutes in the Montana Local Government Accounting and Budgeting Laws, and
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 7–6–4001 to 7–6–4603 (2017) for the Local Government Budget Act.
26
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 13; see MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2–7–501 to 2–7–522
(2017).
27
Id.
28
Id. at 12.
21
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Mitchell argues that the District Court erred when it held she did
not have a “sufficiently concrete injury for standing purposes.”29 There is
a three-part analysis to determine whether there is a justiciable
controversy: (1) the parties must have existing and genuine rights or
interests, not theoretical; (2) the controversy must not merely be a debate
or argument about a purely political, administrative, philosophical, or
academic conclusion, but a controversy on which the court may
effectively operate judgment; and (3) the judicial determination of the
controversy will have the effect of a final judgment in law or in equity
upon the rights, status or legal relationships of the parties.30 Mitchell
argues that those three elements are met for the following reasons.
First, Mitchell argues that her interest is “existing and genuine”
and is not theoretical, as she lives and pays taxes in Glacier County.31
Glacier County violated laws “designed to insure strict accountability of
public revenue,” thus directly impacting Mitchell as a taxpayer.32
Additionally, the State did not enforce the laws that the County violated
and is also at fault.33 Second, Mitchell argues that this controversy is not
an academic or political debate, and that the Court could operate
judgment by granting declaratory and injunctive relief.34 Third, the
judicial determination of this controversy would have the effect of a final
judgment of law.35
Mitchell argues that the clause in Article VIII Section 12 of the
Montana Constitution, which states “the legislature shall by law insure
strict accountability of all revenue,” is a “directive to the Legislature,”
and “is non-self-executing.”36 Because the Legislature enacted laws to
implement “strict accountability” through the SAA and other laws listed
above, this issue is justiciable; however, if the Legislature did not act, the
failure to act would be a non-justiciable political question.37 Mitchell
cites Columbia School District v. State,38 where the Court ruled that,
once the legislature acted or “executed” a provision, courts could
determine whether “that enactment fulfills the Legislature’s
constitutional responsibility.” Therefore, the courts would assure that the
“system enacted by the Legislature enforces, protects, and fulfills the
right” that has been granted by the Constitution.39 Mitchell argues that,
once the Legislature implements the Constitution’s provisions, the Court

29

Id. at 14.
Id. at 14–15 (see Chipman v. Northwest Healthcare Corp., 288 P.3d 193, 200 (Mont. 2012)).
31
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 15.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 15–16.
38
109 P.3d 257, 260–61 (Mont. 2005).
39
Id. at 16 (quoting Columbia School District, 109 P.3d at 261).
30
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can find justiciable issues.40 Once the Legislature implements mandates
in statutes, Courts have an obligation to guard the rights of that
mandate.41
3.
Mitchell has standing, as a taxpayer, to challenge government
entities for fiscal mismanagement, and it is foreseeable that she will
suffer additional property tax burdens, thus showing that a foreseeable
injury has the same effect as a threatened injury.
Standing concerns whether “the litigant is entitled to have the
court decide the merits of the dispute.”42 There are two strands to
standing. First is the case or controversy requirement, where the plaintiff
must “clearly allege a past, present, or threatened injury to a property or
civil right.”43 Additionally, the injury “must be one that would be
alleviated by successfully maintaining the action.”44 The second strand to
standing is prudential limitations.45
a.
Mitchell has standing as a taxpayer according to
Grossman, which relaxed the standing requirements for taxpayers by
allowing them to question the constitutional validity of tax use.
Mitchell argues that the Court has recognized the standing of
taxpayers in prior cases, such as Grossman v. State Dept. of Natural
Resources.46 In Grossman, the Court stated, “We will recognize the
standing of a taxpayer, without more, to question the state constitutional
validity of a tax or use of tax monies” in regard to issues that directly
affect the “constitutional validity of the state or its political subdivision
action to collect the tax, issue bonds, or use the proceeds thereof.”47 The
Appellants contend that the District Court incorrectly applied strict
standing requirements, whereas Grossman correctly relaxed the standing
requirements for taxpayers, stating, “[t]he rule that a taxpayer must be
directly adversely affected to bring an action contesting the validity of
state bonds or the use of tax monies is not as unbendable as our
pronouncements in [other sorts of standing cases].”48 The Court in
Grossman added an exception to taxpayer standing by allowing
taxpayers to question the constitutional validity of taxes that directly
affect the state or its political subdivision with collecting the tax.49
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 16.
Id. at 17.
42
Heffernan v. Missoula City Council, 255 P.3d 80, 91 (Mont. 2011).
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 17; Heffernan, 255 P.3d at 91.
46
Grossman v. State Dept. of Natural Resources, 682 P.2d 1319 (Mont. 1984).
47
Id. 682 P.2d at 1325.
48
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 20 (see Grossman, 682 P.2d at 1325).
49
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 20.
40
41
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b.
It is foreseeable that Mitchell will suffer an injury, which
is analytically akin to a “threatened” injury.
In order to have standing, the complaining party must allege a
past, present, or threatened injury to property or civil rights, and the
injury must “be one that would be alleviated by successfully maintaining
the action.”50 If a plaintiff alleges either a direct economic injury or is
faced with criminal prosecution, the injury requirement of standing is
more easily satisfied.51 To show an injury for standing purposes, the
injury must be a “concrete harm that is actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical.”52 In Helena Parents Commission v. Lewis
and Clark County Commissioners,53 the Court held that the plaintiffs had
standing because they would incur additional tax burdens, and therefore
had an economic injury. Mitchell contends that, similar to Helena
Parents, she will suffer additional property tax burdens because of the
County’s mismanagement of funds.54
Mitchell also notes that a threatened injury is sufficient for
standing. She claims that a threatened injury is “no different than the
‘foreseeable’ injury.”55 Mitchell urges that, similar to Helena Parents,
the imposed tax burden was prospective and constituted a concrete
injury.56 The mismanagement of funds makes it foreseeable that Mitchell
and the other Plaintiffs would suffer an economic injury at some point in
the future, and that is sufficient to meet the standing requirement.57
4.
The two countervailing factors against prudential limitations to
standing apply to the Appellants’ circumstances.
Mitchell argues that the prudential limitations defined in
Hefferman do not apply to her claims. The two prudential limitations
from Hefferman that Mitchell is focusing on are: “a litigant may only
assert her own constitutional rights or immunities,” and “the alleged
injury must be distinguishable from the injury to the public, though not
necessarily exclusive to the plaintiff.”58 Mitchell cites Lee v. State,59
where the Court, when faced with a standing issue about challenging a
speed limit, stated, “The acts of the legislature which directly concern
50

Id. (see Schoof v. Nesbit, 316 P.3d 831, 836, (Mont. 2014)).
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 21.
52
Heffernan, 255 P.3d 80 at 91.
53
992 P.2d 1140, 1143 (Mont. 1996).
54
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 22.
55
Id. at 23.
56
Appellants’ Reply Brief at 10, Mitchell v. Glacier County, https://perma.cc/RV6B-X44N (Mont.
May 22, 2017) (No. DA 16-0716).
57
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 23.
58
Id. at 24 (citing Heffernan, 255 P.3d at 92).
59
635 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Mont. 1981).
51
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large segments of the public, or all the public, are not thereby insulated
from judicial attack.” Otherwise, if a plaintiff wished to test the
constitutional validity of a statute, the “Uniform Declaratory Judgment
Act would become largely useless.”60 Mitchell argues that the District
Court’s holding would render the Declaratory Judgement Act largely
useless, and both Glacier County and the State would be insulated from
judicial scrutiny.61
There are two countervailing factors that weigh against
prudential limitations to standing. First is the “importance of the question
to the public,” and second is “whether the statute at issue would
effectively be immunized from review if the plaintiff were denied
standing.”62 Mitchell argues that those factors apply here. The
relationship between citizens and their government is of great
importance, which satisfies the first factor.63 The second factor is also
satisfied, as it is vital that citizens have recourse when government fails
to enforce the law—especially when government officials fail to comply
with a constitutional mandate.64
5.

The Private Attorney General Doctrine applies.

Mitchell argues that the Private Attorney General Doctrine
applies, as the State’s Department of Administration and its Attorney
General have not enforced the laws in question, including the “strict
accountability” issue.65 The Court stated that the Private Attorney
General Doctrine is “normally utilized when the government, for some
reason, fails to properly enforce interests which are significant to its
citizens.”66 Mitchell argues that, because the State has failed to enforce
the laws at issue, this Doctrine applies.67
6.
The District Court erred when it held that the “Private Right of
Action” Paradigm applied to Appellants.
The District Court held that the SAA and budgeting laws did not
allow the Plaintiffs a “private right to petition for judicial relief.”68
Mitchell contends that the District Court incorrectly confused federal
rules with state rules of decision.69 Mitchell argues that, because federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts cannot develop
60

Id.
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 25.
62
Id. at 25–26.
63
Id. at 26.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 27.
66
In re Dearborn Drainage Area, 782 P.2d 898, 900 (Mont. 1989).
67
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 27.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 28.
61
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substantive common law rules of decision, unless Congress otherwise
directs.70 Montana is a court of general jurisdiction, which Article VII
Section 4 of the Montana Constitution states that the court has original
jurisdiction over “all civil matter and cases at law and in equity.”71 The
Montana Constitution also states, “Courts of justice shall be open to
every person, and speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person,
property, or character.”72 Because Montana has general jurisdiction,
Montana courts are able to “reform common law as justice requires.”73
Mitchell argues that the “private right of action” paradigm is inapplicable
here, as the Montana general jurisdiction applies and does not affect the
status of her justiciability or standing issues.74
7.
This appeal is not moot, as the law does not require a stay or a
supersedeas bond and the County improperly disbursed the protest tax
fund.
Mitchell argues that her appeal is not moot because the tax
protest claim did not require a stay pending appeal. Additionally,
Mitchell argues that she can challenge the County’s conduct whether she
pays under protest or not, so seeking declaratory judgment would not be
moot in that matter. Because Mitchell claims that the County’s deficit
spending will increase her tax burden in the future, her appeal is not
moot.75 Furthermore, Mitchell contends that the County knew of the
Plaintiff’s appeal—which was filed four days after the District Court’s
order—and had no right to disburse the protest funds.76 Section 15–1–
402(4)(a) states that taxes that are placed in a protest fund must be
retained in that fund “until the final determination of any action or
suit.”77 Mitchell argues that “final determination” means a final appellate
decision, as that would end uncertainty.78 Mitchell states that the County
should “not be allowed to evade appellate review by unlawfully
disbursing the funds and declaring its violations as ‘moot.’”79
B. Appellee Glacier County
1.
Mitchell does not have standing because she lacks a personal
stake in the outcome of the case and has not presented an actual case.
70

Id. at 28–29.
Mont. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
72
Mont. CONST. art. II, § 16.
73
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 29 (quoting Mountain West Bureau Ins. Co. v.
Brewer, 69 P.3d 652, 657 (Mont. 2003)).
74
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 30.
75
Appellants’ Reply Brief, supra note 58, at 17.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 18.
79
Id.
71
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Glacier County contends that Mitchell has not alleged any
personal stake, such as a personal injury to a property or civil right, in
her claims.80 According to Heffernan, a “personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy at the commencement of the litigation” is required in
order to have standing.81 Glacier County argues that Mitchell’s allegation
of a “foreseeable injury” is abstract, and is not sufficient to meet the
standing requirement of having a “concrete” injury.82 Glacier County
argues that Mitchell has not suffered a past, present, or threatened
injury.83
Glacier County contends that Mitchell has not objected to the use
of tax monies or to the validity of a tax, but instead has claimed that an
injury to her is foreseeable.84 Glacier County agrees with the District
Court, which found that Mitchell did not plead any loss of public funds,
higher taxes, or reduced services.85 The District Court stated that
“Mitchell’s disapproval” of Glacier County’s accounting and fiscal
management skills is not enough for standing.86 Glacier County argues
that, although there may have been mistakes in fiscal management which
may be of concern to taxpayers, “generalized grievances” do not
constitute a judicial controversy.87
Glacier County further argues that Mitchell does not have a
concrete injury because of the manner in which she protested her taxes.
According to the Montana Code Annotated, § 15–1–402(1)(a), the
person protesting a property tax may contest “that portion of the property
tax or fee protested.”88 Additionally, § 15–1–401(1)(b)(iii) states that the
protested payment must “not exceed the difference between the payment
for the immediately preceding tax year and the amount owing in the tax
year protested unless a different amount results from the specified
grounds of protest . . . .”89 Although Mitchell relied upon the “unless”
portion of the statute, Mitchell did not specify what amount of tax was
being protested, and for what reason other than that an injury to the
taxpayers was foreseeable.90
Lastly, Glacier County argues that Mitchell is essentially
requesting the Court grant injunctive relief for the County to better
manage its finances.91 Glacier County contends that injunctive relief is
Appellee Glacier County’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 14.
Heffernan, 255 P.3d at 90.
82
Appellee Glacier County’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 14 (see Schoof, 316 P.3d at 836).
83
Appellee Glacier County’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 14.
84
Id. at 16.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 17.
87
Id. at 18.
88
MONT. CODE ANN. § 15–1–402(1)(a) (2017).
89
MONT. CODE ANN. § 15–1–402(1)(b)(iii) (2017).
90
Appellee Glacier County’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 8.
91
Id. at 22.
80
81
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not available for protestation of taxes, and that Mitchell’s cause of action
“has nothing to do with protestation of taxes.”92 Glacier County states
that the Appellants are “demanding the Glacier County officials comply
with their personal wishes as taxpayers,” and that “[s]uch actions are
reserved for the voting booth.”93
2.
Mitchell cannot point to any individual concrete injury for her
other claims.
Glacier County contends that, with regard to the Montana Local
Government Accounting Laws, Local Government Budget Act, and
SAA, Mitchell did not allege any concrete injury.94 For the SAA, Glacier
County contends that there is no actual evidence in the record that the
County violated the public trust, and therefore there is no concrete injury.
In response to Mitchell’s claim concerning the Private Attorney General
Doctrine, Glacier County states that the Doctrine does not apply against
the County, as it is not a cause of action but is a claim for relief.95 As for
justiciability, Glacier County argues that the Plaintiffs have no standing
because their alleged claims are theoretical. Glacier County contends that
Mitchell does not meet the three requirements for having a justiciable
controversy. Mitchell’s claim of having a foreseeable injury is
speculative and is not enough to have a justiciable controversy.96
3.
Mitchell’s Declaratory Judgment Action is not applicable to this
case, and, for the most part, injunctive relief is not available for
protestation of taxes.
Glacier County argues that Montana’s Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act is not applicable because of the taxation statutes in
Montana.97 According to § 15–1–406 in the Montana Code Annotated,
the remedy authorized for tax issues is “the exclusive method of
obtaining a declaratory judgment concerning a tax authorized by the state
. . . The remedy authorized by this section supersedes the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act established in Title 27, chapter 8.”98 Section
15–1–406(1) states that a taxpayer may bring a declaratory judgment
action in the District Court, but for (a) “illegal or improper” use by the
department, or (b) if the tax was “illegally or unlawfully imposed or
exceeded the taxing authority of the entity imposing the tax.”99 Glacier
92

Id.
Id. at 23.
94
Id. at 24–25.
95
Appellee Glacier County’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 25.
96
Id. at 26–27.
97
Id. at 28.
98
MONT. CODE ANN. § 15–1–406 (2017).
99
MONT. CODE ANN. § 15–1–406(1) (2017).
93
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County argues that the “only reason you can protest taxes to a County” is
if the tax was illegally or unlawfully imposed, or if it exceeded the
County’s taxing authority.100 Glacier County states that Mitchell did not
allege illegal or unlawful tax usage, and that she merely wanted Glacier
County to do “a better job of governance.”101
Glacier County believes that Mitchell is essentially asking for
injunctive relief.102 However, under § 15–1–405(1), a court must not
grant an injunction to restrain the collection of any tax except “where the
tax or the part thereof sought to be enjoined is illegal or not authorized
by law.”103 Glacier County argues that Mitchell did not raise a
protestation of taxes claim, and that injunctive relief, as well as
declaratory judgement, is not an available remedy.
4.

Because Mitchell did not file for a stay, the case is moot.

Glacier County argues that, even if Mitchell’s claims were ripe
when they were made, her claims are now moot because she did not file
for a stay or supersedeas bond. According to Reichert v. State, ex. rel.,
McCulloch,104 ripeness examines whether a non-existing injury will
become an injury, or is too remote to support present adjudication;
whereas mootness, on the other hand, asks if “an injury that has
happened is too far beyond a useful remedy.” The personal interest
requirement of standing, which occurs at the commencement of
litigation, must continue throughout the case.105
Glacier County argues that Mitchell’s claims became moot
because she did not file for a stay or supersedeas bond, according to
Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 22.106 Glacier County
contends that, even though it is not required, under Rule 22(1)(a)(i)
Mitchell needed to file a motion to stay the District Court’s Order, or
needed to suspend its Order pending appeal under Rule 22(1)(a)(iii).
Because Mitchell did neither, Glacier County distributed the tax dollars
held in the protest tax fund.107 Although it is not required to file for a
stay, a party that does not seek a stay runs the risk of its appeal becoming
moot.108 Glacier County contends that is the case for Mitchell.
Additionally, § 15–1–402(4)(a) requires that protested taxes be put in the
tax protest fund until there is a final determination of any suit. Glacier

Appellee Glacier County’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 29 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 30.
102
Id. at 30.
103
MONT. CODE ANN. § 15–1–405(1) (2017).
104
278 P.3d 455, 472 (Mont. 2012).
105
Appellant Glacier County’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 32 (see Greater Missoula Area Fedn.
of Early Childhood Educators v. Childstart, Inc., 219 P.3d 888, 889 (Mont. 2009)).
106
Appellant Glacier County’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 32.
107
Id. at 34.
108
Id. at 36 (see Kennedy v. Dawson, 989 P.2d 390, 395 (Mont. 1999)).
100
101
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County argues that the District Court’s decision was a final
determination in this current suit.109
C. Appellee State of Montana
1.
Mitchell lacks standing to sue the State under the SAA and
Article VIII.
a.
The Legislature, after enacting the SAA, did not intend
to confer individual rights
sufficient enough to provide Mitchell
standing.
The State contends that the SAA determines whether Mitchell
has standing to sue the State for failing to enforce the law. Mitchell must
allege a concrete injury to a legally protected interest established by the
SAA, like a property or civil right.110 According to Schoof, standing
depends on whether the constitutional or statutory provision “can be
understood as granting persons in the plaintiff’s position a right to
judicial relief.”111 The State contends that if a statute does not provide
any individual rights “susceptible to injury or amenable to judicial
relief,” then there is no standing to sue.112
The State also argues that Montana’s constitutional “case or
controversy” requirement aligns with the case or controversy
requirements set forth in Article III of the United States Constitution.113
Article III of the United States Constitution states an actual or threatened
injury may exist through statutes creating legal rights, which, when
invaded, would create standing.114 The State argues that the District
Court correctly held that there were no provisions within the SAA to
establish individual civil rights.115
Furthermore, the State contends that the SAA is discretionary
and does not grant individual rights to Mitchell. The State points to the
language in certain sections of the Montana Code Annotated, such as §
2–7–517(1), which states that the Department “may issue an order
stopping payment of any state financial assistance.”116 The State also
cites § 2–7–503(5), which “allows, but does not require,” the Department
to audit or review local government entities.117 The State believes that the
decision to withhold financial assistance is determined “in accordance
Appellee Glacier County’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 36.
Appellee State of Montana’s Answering Brief, supra note 8, at 16.
111
Id. at 17 (citing Schoof, 316 P.3d at 837).
112
Appellee State of Montana’s Answering Brief, supra note 8, at 17.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 20.
117
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with rules adopted by the department,” according to § 2–7–515(3).118
From there, the Department has the discretion to request the withholding
of financial assistance. The State argues that the language of the rules is
permissive; therefore, enforcement of the rules is not mandatory.119
b.
The SAA does not provide a basis for Mitchell to bring a
private action against the
State.
The State argues that the SAA does not provide any private right
of action or citizen enforcement mechanism, and that only the
Department has regulatory and enforcement provisions.120 The State
distinguishes this situation from Wombold v. Associates Financial
Services Company of Montana, Inc.,121 where the legislature granted
certain rights to borrowers regarding the structure of their loans. In
Wombold, the Court held that the legislative intent was to protect the
borrowers, which allowed an implied private right of action.122 In
comparison, the State argues that the SAA does not provide any
“beneficial or remedial provisions aimed at a certain class of citizens,”
and the SAA is enforced solely by the State.123 Additionally, the SAA
does not provide attorney fees by a prevailing party, whereas in
Wombold the Consumer Loan Act provided attorney fees.124 These
differences illustrate that the SAA does not give Mitchell a private right
of action.
c.
Mitchell does not have standing under Article VIII
Section 12 of the Montana
Constitution because it is not a selfexecuting clause.
The State contends that Mitchell is not challenging the
constitutionality of the SAA under Article VIII Section 12 of the
Montana Constitution. Instead, Mitchell argues that the State breached its
duties directly under the SAA and the duties owed under Article VIII.125
The State agrees with the District Court that Article VIII Section 12 does
not “grant an individual the right to be free of municipal fiscal
mismanagement.”126 The State argues that Article VIII Section 12 does
not grant Mitchell an individual right to strict accountability of
government monies; instead, the Legislature intended it to protect the
Appellee State of Montana’s Answering Brief, supra note 8, at 21.
Id. at 22.
120
Id. at 25.
121
104 P.3d 1080, 1085 (Mont. 2004).
122
Id. 104 P.3d at 1086.
123
Appellee State of Montana’s Answering Brief, supra note 8, at 26.
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Id. at 33.
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Id. at 34.
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public by adopting the proper statutes. Mitchell did not challenge
whether the SAA fulfills the “strict accountability” requirements of
Article VIII Section 12, and therefore does not have standing against the
State.127
2.
Mitchell does not have standing with either the Private Attorney
General Doctrine or the Declaratory Judgment Act.
The State argues that the Private Attorney General Doctrine does
not confer standing because it is not a cause of action and does not
“create a private right of action where none exists.”128 Additionally, the
State contends that Mitchell does not have standing under the
Declaratory Judgement Act because it is not a “freestanding source of
standing” for a plaintiff who does not show an injury or threatened injury
to himself through the act of a public official.129 The State argues that the
Declaratory Judgment Act is about declaring rights, and Mitchell does
not have standing because the statutes in question do not confer any
rights capable of being taken away.130 The State contends that
“Declaratory claims cannot bootstrap or manufacture standing if no
individual rights are at issue in the statute that underlies the claims.”131
Because the SAA does not confer to Mitchell’s rights capable of being
taken away, their declaratory judgment claims are not judicially
cognizable.132
3.
The Local Government Accounting Act, the Local Government
Budget Act, and the Debt Management Act do not impose any duties on
the State.
The State contends that the Local Government Accounting Act,
§ 7–6–612(2)(a), applies to the County, as cash reports are made to the
County’s government body. The State alleges that there is no
enforcement role for the State or Department in this regard. Additionally,
the only role the state has in the Local Government Budget Act is that it
will act as a public repository for local government budgets. There are no
duties imposed on the State under the Debt Management Act, § 7–7–
2101, which instead concern the county.133
4.
Mitchell cannot seek to compel discretionary acts because the
SAA provides discretionary enforcement powers.
127
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Lastly, the State argues that Mitchell cannot seek a writ of
mandate to compel the State to enforce the SAA because the SAA does
not require the Department to withhold financial assistance to local
governmental entities that do not comply with the law. The Department
has discretion, under the SAA, to decide whether or not to penalize local
government entities, and therefore Mitchell cannot seek a writ of
mandate.134
V. ANALYSIS
This case hinges upon whether Mitchell has a concrete injury to
constitute standing. If the Court holds that this case is like Helena
Parents, Columbia Falls, and Grossman, the case could be remanded
back to the District Court to litigate the other claims. Assuming Glacier
County mismanaged its funds, the Court will focus on two primary
questions: whether Mitchell’s claim of a foreseeable injury is enough to
grant her standing, and whether Mitchell raises the proper claims in order
to have standing.
If the Court follows the precedent set in Helena Parents and
finds that Mitchell’s foreseeable injury is enough to confer standing, the
strict standing requirements will be less restrictive for bringing claims
against government fiscal mismanagement. The standing requirements
for injury would be interpreted more broadly, as the Court stated in
Helena Parents. Similar to Helena Parents, there would be standing for
taxpayers in Glacier County with a foreseeable injury incurred by future
property tax increases. This means that Mitchell would have a concrete
injury by having a threatened injury in the future. On the other hand, if
the Court decides that a foreseeable injury in the future is not concrete
enough to confer standing, Glacier County’s analysis that Mitchell’s
claims are too theoretical may be taken into consideration, requiring that
taxpayers have to suffer an injury either to their rights or property
directly before bringing a claim.
If the Court follows the precedent established in Grossman and
holds that Mitchell has standing, then Grossman would allow the Court
to have more relaxed standards towards taxpayers. Grossman would
broaden standing to include claims applying to statutory violations.
Conversely, the Court may hold that Grossman is inapplicable to
Mitchell’s claims if it finds she did not challenge the constitutional
validity of the County taxes or argue the constitutionality of the statutes
in question.
As a matter of policy, it appears the Legislative intent of the
SAA was to ensure that governmental entities are held accountable. § 2–
134
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7–502(2)(e) in the Montana Code Annotated explicitly states that the
purpose of the SAA is to “ensure that the stewardship of local
government entities is conducted in a manner to preserve and protect the
public trust.”135 If the Court holds that Mitchell has no standing with her
claims involving the SAA, then the State’s interpretation––that the SAA
does not give people individual rights to challenge the accountability of
government and therefore have no standing––gives citizens little
recourse to hold government officials responsible for their actions.
If the Court finds that Mitchell has standing and the case is
remanded, the District Court will have to decide if Glacier County’s
audits were in compliance with the SAA. Furthermore, the District court
would likely have to clarify the SAA regarding issues such as whether it
is mandatory or discretionary for the Department of Administration to
enforce certain laws. Additionally, questions about whether the SAA
grants individual rights to citizens concerning tax issues will need to be
addressed, as well as the Legislative intent of the SAA regarding how
much power the SAA has to ensure laws are enforced.
Ultimately, the Court will need to decide whether the taxpayers
have standing to hold government entities accountable for their fiscal
responsibility to have a balanced budget. The two countervailing factors
to prudential limitations for standing136 seem to directly apply to this
case, as potential increased property tax burdens are of great importance
to the people residing in Glacier County. Additionally, if the Court finds
that Mitchell and the putative class do not have standing, then the
statutes in question may be immunized from review. However, if the
Court decides that Mitchell does not have a concrete injury and has no
claims that can be remanded to the District Court, then the many
questions about Glacier County’s budgeting, the State’s role in enforcing
fiscal mismanagement, and the potential constitutional violation will be
unanswered.
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